East London Health and Care Partnership:
Consultation on payment development and drivers for change

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Summary

East London Health and Care Partnership (ELHCP) is working towards a new approach to managing health and care across East London, working together in a more integrated way and taking shared accountability for delivering improved outcomes for local populations. As part of this, the three sub-systems within ELHCP (i. City and Hackney; ii. Waltham Forest, Newham and Tower Hamlets; and iii. Barking and Dagenham, Havering and Redbridge) are developing Accountable Care Systems (ACSs) and are keen to use a consistent approach. To support this, it is important to examine current payment mechanisms and consider where changes to payment can support system development in East London.

There is a need to reduce variations in the quality of care and develop care packages that provide a patient-centred and coordinated approach. Alongside this, by the 2020/21 financial year the overall funding gap in East London is projected to be £578 million. We will not be able to rely on external funding to solve these issues. Improvements to services will need to be made and the funding gap will need to be closed using a combination of service redesign and improved productivity. The way the system currently pays for services and works together as organisations make it harder to successfully meet these challenges.

Service design and ways of working will be the primary route to meet system challenges. There are a number of payment options and combinations of payment approaches that may enable incentives within the system to operate in a more coherent way, and more effectively enable the delivery of system objectives. At present in East London there are a variety of contractual payment mechanisms running concurrently depending on the type of organisation.

The diagram below gives an illustration of challenges:
As a system we must consider what configuration of payment will most effectively support system objectives. Examples and evidence from other areas, including NHS vanguards, can be drawn on to inform our thinking.

We recognise that, on its own, changing payment will not solve all the system issues. Payment systems can support strategy, but should not drive it. Therefore, new governance arrangements are also needed to ensure ELHCP can deliver genuinely accountable, coordinated care. These arrangements need to be underpinned by improved data collection and use of analytics for strategic commissioning as well as continual improvement to care. New contracting frameworks and payment mechanisms can feed into this and support clinical improvement.

The ELHCP is clear that work to develop payments should not be used (or perceived) as a programme to cut costs. The aims of this work are to ensure the system is maximising use of the resources available to it and to support ELHCP discussions about improving service delivery and prioritising care in a transparent and evidence-based way.
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To help readers navigate this document the following diagram is located at the front of each section of this document. It will highlight:

- What section the reader is on
- Content and themes covered in that section
- Consultation questions asked in that section

Summary
1. Structure and timelines
2. Context and view of the current payment system
3. Payment options and considerations
4. Service model, system organisation and pace of change
5. What else is needed to support system objectives?
1. Structure and timelines

1.1. This paper considers the strategic objectives for ELHCP and asks: how appropriate are existing payment systems to deliver shared Sustainability and Transformation Plan (STP) objectives? It is broken into five sections.

- Section one provides an overview of the paper structure and content as well as the consultation process.
- Section two sets out the challenges faced by health and social care over the coming years, nationally and within East London.
- Section three outlines payment options in use across East London and seeks to describe the benefits and issues with these approaches. It also considers alternative payment options and looks at examples of local health and care payment approaches developed elsewhere.
- Section four considers options for contractual form and scope and scale of service models that payment may cover. It also outlines possible timelines for transitioning to a new payment approach that may be developed.
- Section five notes other workstreams that are needed at an STP level to complement development work around payment design. Without these other components any change in payment will not drive the desired change in the system.

1.2. Throughout this document are thirteen questions. They are clearly labelled at the end of each section and are intended to generate a base understanding of each organisation’s views. An eleven week engagement period will start on Tuesday 11 July 2017. The consultation will take account of both written and verbal feedback. Verbal feedback will be captured through workshops – which will include engagement with providers, commissioners, voluntary sector, front line staff, patients, residents and carers.

1.3. Further to this, each organisation is asked to draft a written response. The eleven-week engagement period has been set to give organisations the opportunity to engage their Board and other leaders in their response. Therefore, feedback should reflect organisational consensus.
1.4. Written and verbal feedback will be consolidated to generate an understanding of areas of consensus and points of difference, and inform next steps. **Written responses should be sent to enquiries@eastlondonhcp.nhs.uk by 18:00 on Friday 29 September 2017.** This is an extension from the original deadline of 4 September. If you have general questions about this document or the consultation process please send them to the email address above or Katie.brennan1@nhs.net.

1.5. For ease of reference, the list of thirteen questions is available in the annex to this document. This is a simple template that can be copied into another document to allow for free text responses.

1.6. Next steps: pending feedback, a working group will be established to develop recommendations.
2. Context and view of the current payment system

Background and context

2.1. Across East London providers and commissioners must meet increased financial pressures and a need to provide more person-centred care. There are practical challenges and barriers that prevent us from achieving this:

- The practicalities of working across team and organisational boundaries are often a major challenge, running contrary to existing cultural and structural characteristics.

- In all sectors, financial pressures and increased workload can have an impact on the ability to innovate and transition to change.

- Some providers face substantial fixed costs, commitments that cannot be shifted within short or medium term time horizons.

- East London faces a total financial gap of £578m in the ‘do nothing’ scenario to reach a break even position by the 2020/21 financial year. Achieving a 1% surplus target for commissioners increases the gap by another £30m to around £610m.

2.2. East London Healthcare Partnership (ELHCP) is comprised of providers, commissioners and local government representatives covering the eight local government footprints. Across the ELHCP, health and care partners have an ambition to develop more effective and coordinated approaches to delivering care across the local health systems. To meet these challenges ELHCP organisations will need to confirm common objectives, agree ways of working, develop governance arrangements and consider service model design. These will be central drivers of change. Payment development and the availability of good quality data and analytics both have an important role to play to support that work and align incentives across the system.

2.3. Historically, the majority of NHS healthcare has been paid for on an activity basis. This was introduced to encourage activity and investment in the system when funding was increasing and waiting times needed to be reduced. The payment approach was initially effective at driving investment and reducing waiting times. However, it has had the unintended consequence of drawing health and care resources towards operational capacity for measurable units of treatment, with insufficient focus on improving the
outcomes and wellbeing patients experience. It also limits the opportunity for targeting investment in a more flexible and effective way.

2.4. Today, our health and care systems face new challenges. The system must deliver improved quality, a more patient-centred approach to care, better support for population health and more effective use of resources.

2.5. The challenges our partnership faces are consistent with the issues described in the Five Year Forward View\(^1\), published in October 2014, and the accompanying ‘Next Steps’\(^2\) document, published in March 2017. They set out objectives for care that is patient-centred, focused on recovery, prevention and early intervention. They also set out the need for a health and care system that makes best use of resource and treats people in the lowest intensity setting - providing care ‘closer to home’ where ever possible. This need is primarily driven by what people say they want and need from health and care services.

2.6. Messages from national bodies have been increasingly consistent when it comes to possible solutions. They are encouraging local health and care systems to adopt a more coordinated approach to find solutions to the challenges they face. Those in prominent national roles have advocated implementation of a capitated payment linked to outcomes as the best way to support needed change. In any case, there is a clear move in national policy to encourage payments linked to person-centred outcome measures. This has been signalled as a desirable direction of travel from NHS England and been enshrined in the tariff. For example, as of April 2017 NHS England and NHS Improvement require mental health providers and commissioners to adopt transparent payment approaches based on capitation or episodic payment, which must be linked to achievement of agreed outcomes. In ELHCP, work is underway to comply with these requirements using existing data and information. Plans to develop improved patient level data for mental health will support this work further in future.

2.7. NHS England and NHS Improvement support development of local solutions that are co-developed and can demonstrate positive impacts on ways of working and system goals. This means local areas have an opportunity to drive their destiny, but they must take active steps to develop a local approach. If not a solution may be imposed by national bodies. Within ELHCP we need to consider and develop the best payment approach for our local system.

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\(^1\) The Five Year Forward View, NHS England (23 Oct 2014) [https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/futurenhs/](https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/futurenhs/)

Specific challenges within East London

2.8. Often, payment development is perceived to be about transferring risk from one part of the system to another, or from one organisation to another. However, to be successful, payment development must be about enabling new ways of working. This means:

- ensure those in the health and care system with the power to change how care is delivered have the right incentives to do so – and that incentives within the system are aligned with one another;
- remove barriers to organisations and staff working in a more coordinated way;
- a cultural change, so the system works together towards collective, local objectives and system partners are empowered to take a more patient-focused approach to service design; and
- ensure risk is shared across the partnership in the safest way.

2.9. Within London there is a recognition that care needs to change and a desire to innovate. Below are two examples that illustrate issues that are more difficult to address in the context of the current payment structure.

- **Outpatient care:**
  - There is a desire to move to new ways of working for delivery of outpatient care. The way current payment levels are set across the system and payment mechanisms interact can provide a disincentive to coordinate care and develop person-centred service models. For example it makes it more difficult to:
    - increase advice and guidance provided to people and patients to prevent issues arising and allow them to manage their wellbeing;
    - move towards more non-face to face consultations, where appropriate; and
    - make better use of scarce hospital capacity and enable patients to have access to specialist consultation without the inconvenience of an often unnecessary hospital visit.
  - **Other issues include:**
    - The variation between payments received for non-face to face versus face to face is too large;
    - There are no mechanisms for income to reflect fixed costs and stepped costs that may become ‘stranded’; and
    - There is no national tariff guidance or advice about how to address issues identified within ‘pay for activity’ frameworks.

- **End of life care:**
  - Current service provision within the STP footprint is poor overall and only a small proportion of patients currently die at home or at the place of their choosing. Sufficient payment levers are not currently in place across both the health and care system to be able to realign this.
  - There is no incentive for providers from different sectors to work together and provide joined up care.
Existing financial mechanisms are skewed by payment for activity, which has a tendency to incentivise care to take place within a hospital even if that is not in line with the patient’s preference.

2.10. It is clear that the system must adapt to address these pressing challenges.

- Evidence from work in the NHS as well as international examples suggests providers and commissioners need to work more collaboratively and take a system/population view of care and resource use.

- A number of structural and cultural changes are needed to support this:
  - payment development;
  - improved use of data and analytics; and
  - governance arrangements that enable organisations and front line staff to work in a more coordinated way.

2.11. There are a range of ways health and care systems have delivered this type of change in England and abroad (examples include Oxfordshire Mental Health, and see footnote 3 above for international examples). Improved accessibility and use of linked data sets and payment reform have featured as a key part of achieving these goals. An agreed set of objectives and clear vision for the system is also important, the vision for the payment system should be fully in line with the vision for the wider health and care sector. The ELHCP now needs to decide what the right approach is for our populations and health and care economies. Can this be achieved via tweaks to the existing payment system, or is more comprehensive payment development needed?

Setting objectives and agreeing priorities

2.12. Lessons from other health and care systems within the NHS demonstrate the need for a clear vision and set of priorities to mobilise thinking and focus efforts toward common goals. All parties within the health and care sector that want to implement new ways of working need to be clear about what the system is trying to achieve. When setting these objectives it is important to put patient and population needs at their centre. This promotes a patient-centred approach to solutions and aligns system objectives with those of front line staff and the population. It is also important to be

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https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/population-health-systems/kaiser-permanente-united-states


5 http://www.pwc.co.uk/industries/government-public-sector/healthcare/insights/shifting-to-accountable-care-characteristics-and-capabilities.html:

‘Experience from accountable care organisations operating across the world shows that the successful delivery of accountable care requires capability in eight key areas: 1. Strategy & vision: There is a compelling vision and clear strategy for managing and delivering clinical, patient and service user outcomes. This is shared by all organisations involved in the delivery of health and care.’
open about local opportunities, and challenges that need to be addressed. It is important for payment to be developed and configured in a way that supports agreed system objectives.

2.13. From a patient perspective, the ELHCP\(^6\) sets out areas for improvement:

- Apart from City and Hackney all East London areas are below the national average for success in getting a GP appointment and ‘ease of getting through to someone at a GP surgery on the phone’ (based on patient surveys).

- Address inconsistent patient experience for A&E, inpatients, maternity, and outpatients and for mental health providers (based on Friends and Family Test).

- Many patients do not die in their preferred place (as few as 22-29% in some areas. See example above on end of life care).

- One year survival rate for all cancers is lower across all seven CCGs than survival rates across England.

2.14. In most cases what local people want from their interactions with the health and care service is consistent across geographies – and the list is likely to resonate with each of us as service users. The patient representative group National Voices has set out what service-users say they want and findings from Barking and Dagenham, Havering and Redbridge (BHR) and Tower Hamlets echo these national themes:

- the ability to plan my care with people who work together to understand me and my carer(s);
- allow me control; and
- bring together services to achieve the outcomes important to me\(^7\).

2.15. To deliver better outcomes for patients and address the strategic system challenges, providers and commissioners across ELHCP will need to focus on the following:

- incentivising early intervention and prevention for whole populations;
- encouraging all providers collectively operate within costs constraints of the system; and
- removing the barriers that currently block care coordination.

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\(^6\) ELHCP October 2016, apart from the first bullet, which represents updated data (as of 7 July 2017) from the NHSE’s GP Patient Survey [https://gp-patient.co.uk/](https://gp-patient.co.uk/)

2.16. Change will not happen overnight. Improvement processes can be overstretched and become unfocused unless they have clear priorities. It is important that system leaders agree clear system-wide objectives and, given that, decide which areas of work to prioritise. Possible areas to prioritise include:

i. Incentivise better outcomes rather than increased volume of interventions.
ii. Reward delivery of care that enables patients to control decisions regarding their own health and care.
iii. Manage financial risk between organisations.
iv. Manage transformation and the process of transition.
v. Design a contractual framework that aligns providers and commissioners objectives to deliver collective outcomes.
vi. Improve quality-linked patient-level data across the whole system.

**Question 1:** What are your top five priority areas relating to the payment system to support better outcomes for patients across the system?
3. Payment options and considerations

3.1. Across health and care systems a range of payment approaches are generated using adaptations of a standard set of payment tools: fee for activity, block payment, capitated payment, payment for outcomes, cost and volume arrangements and so on. Drawing on these tools, and using them in combination, there are an infinite number of payment options that may be developed and implemented locally. This section considers system goals that payment needs to support, outlines common payment approaches used in East London, examines a range of payment approaches available and offers real world examples of different local payment approaches.

Overview of payment forms (this list is not exhaustive)

3.2. Payment cannot drive transformation, but it has an important role to play in supporting system change. This section provides an overview of a range of payment forms that can be drawn on when developing local payment approaches. All have benefits and drawbacks. The important thing when designing a payment approach is to ensure that incentives across the system are appropriately aligned to support desired outcomes and reduce the risk of unintended consequences.

3.3. Block payments offer a fixed amount of funding to a provider to deliver care to an agreed population over a fixed period of time. This provides a stable source of funding to enable investment and delivery of quality care. It is calculated based on historical expenditure and can be adjusted to reflect expected efficiency gains, trends in patient needs (demographic growth and changes in case mix) and cost uplifts. Non-acute providers using block contracts have a clear awareness of their cost envelope and can organise their service availability to match it. However, since they then have limited capability to flex their staffing they have little incentive to attract additional work. To manage demand they may extend waiting times, take a measured approach to acute discharge and actively move patients on to alternative care settings.

3.4. Primary care per capita is payment for core GP services allocated on a per capita basis, using an average payment per patient based on the GP patient list. In principle, this arrangement incentivises GPs to take on new patients. In addition to core services, commissioners provide specific additional payments for items of locally prioritised...
activity, for example locally-enhanced services linked to clinical outcomes for specific long term conditions. The bulk of primary care funding and costs, therefore, are relatively predictable, enabling them to remain financially sustainable as providers. GPs provide direct treatment, but they also have a significant role diagnosing and referring patients to alternative care settings. The increasing constraints on GP time and the increase in the number of appointments/contacts they are required to make potentially creates a perverse incentive to avoid risk and refer patients for tests or acute diagnoses rather than undertake measures available out of hospital that might be viable alternatives. The limitation on their resource can also limit their capacity to provide preventative care in the most effective way.

3.5. **Fee for service** means a care provider is paid separately for each component of an interaction with a patient. This means there is a specific price for each individual resource used (ice pack, splint, serum, etc.) and for each care action taken (scan interpretation, drawing blood, physical examination, etc.). Some private insurers in the United States use this approach for payment. Provided fees are set at or above efficient cost levels, it offers remuneration for all activity and resources used to treat a patient, but does not create incentives for early intervention, preventative care or coordination between care providers.

3.6. **Payment by activity** (as per the current national tariff). This is payment by event or episode. It was developed over a decade ago, at a time when the NHS had a specific set of priorities to reduce waiting times and increase acute activity. However, it can limit incentives for coordinated care or care focused on early intervention and recovery. Further limitations of this approach are explored in para 3.10.

3.7. **Cost and Volume payment** is a variant of payment for activity, and often incorporates caps and collars. This payment mechanism helps to manage volume risk. It involves a block element for the core service, allowing for variable costs and/or case adjustment between a threshold and a ceiling. This works particularly well for services that have to be provided come what may, where it is clear what the core service costs for example, A&E services have to be provided 24 hours a day seven days a week. The contract can be set assuming a certain level of patient attendances and acuity, with additional payments up to a ceiling that are flexed if more people attend than expected. This type of approach can be useful to address a specific volume risk in one service, but on its own does not support reduced demand risk or integrated approaches to care.

3.8. **Outcomes based payment** is where organisations link a portion of payment to attainment of agreed objectives. Evidence suggests that outcomes based payment is most effective at supporting transformation when focused on a small set of measures that are aligned to patient and population outcomes rather than more specific and lengthy list of clinical outcomes. It is also more effective when framed as a payment rather than a penalty, and supports innovation best when it accounts for a relatively

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small share of total payment. If the size of the outcomes-based payment as a share of the total payment is set too high, the agreed metrics are likely to focus on clinical outcomes that can be easily achieved rather than more ambitious person-centred outcomes. Successful outcomes based payments require co-development of appropriate metrics and the existence (or development) of supporting data systems to allow agreed outcomes to be measured in a direct way, limiting proxy indicators wherever possible.

3.9. **Gain and loss share arrangements** can give providers an opportunity to have a stake in the success of the system. It can allow them to retain a share of savings they are able to generate for the system or have to absorb a share of losses incurred. They can also be deployed to mitigate financial risk to individual organisations that are due to switching to a new integrated care model, by redistributing changes in revenue from one part of the system to another. In financially constrained health and care systems the ability for gain and loss share arrangements to operate effectively is more limited, as any funds in the pot will need to be held back from funds that may be needed to provide care. In this case it may be more appropriate to have an agreed risk pool across providers and commissioners that is ring-fenced to manage unanticipated changes in demand.

Payment approaches widely used within East London Health and Care Partnership

3.10. This section looks at payment forms used within ELHCP and considers the incentives they place on the system. There are a number of smaller scale commissioning arrangements that are experimenting with different payment forms in order to improve incentives within the system. However, at present, the majority commissioning arrangements within ELHCP combine:

- Fee for activity – or Payment by Results in the acute sector; with
- Block payments for community and MH services; and
- Primary care per capita core payments and outcomes payments.

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![Image](image-url)
3.11. The structure of the current payment system as outlined in the diagram above supports some objectives desired by the system, but also presents real barriers to realising the changes required.

- **Benefits include:**
  - It encourages providers to clear RTT backlogs in acute care, ensuring payment for units of care provided, enabling activity and reducing backlogs.
  - It allows quality of care per intervention to remain to standard in acute settings, through nationally prescribed reimbursement for each unit of care delivered.
  - It encourages quality coding of data for acute care as payment is linked to it.
  - It enables providers to manage, and be remunerated for, unanticipated surges in demand.
  - It stimulates providers to be internally efficient.

- **Issues include:**
  - It is not designed to promote or support larger scale shifts in care from settings where the prevailing contract form is activity driven, to other settings where care is paid for under a block contract.
  - It is not well suited to promote coordination of a more patient-centred way of delivering care.
  - It provides almost insufficient direct incentive for health promotion and disease prevention at the provider level, locking the vast majority of NHS funding into treating the effects of poor health rather than preventing their occurrence.
  - It does little to support targeted investment of funds to areas that will deliver more effective care, or better efficiency, productivity or innovation across the wider system. I.e. it does not always support allocative efficiency of care across the system.
  - It provides insufficient direct financial incentive for providers to engage in patient flow and demand management programmes across the system. For example, demand pressures may continue to result in activity and referral rates in the acute sector that are above plan. In this case, performance targets may be breached and the cost to the system of acute activity becomes unsustainable.
  - Tariff-based payment rewards delivery of prescribed interventions on a volume basis, which may not always lead to better outcomes for the patient and the system.
  - It can be perceived as complex to understand. This acts as a barrier to engaging staff (in particular clinical staff) to understand the impact the payment system has on care delivery within the local system – this effects the quality of discussions on root cause analysis and solutions when looking to support change.
Where Trusts are under financial pressure, it can create a tension between (i) the draw to meet local needs and coordinate with local partners and (ii) pressure from regulators to maximise funding streams to shore up financial position.

3.12. Clearly the payment system can act to create pressure and impact adversely on both commissioner and provider organisations. Currently, the tools to address issues in the system are not in the hands of those who have the capability to impact change on the ground.

Question 2: In your organisation’s view, how does the current payment system support and inhibit attainment of system objectives?

Examples of local payment solutions

3.13. There is a growing consensus within the English NHS and internationally that having both payment by activity arrangements and block contracts in place does not create the most effective mechanisms to support co-ordinated, patient-centred, prevention-focused and sustainable care. For example, under this payment system funding must flow to acute providers as their activity increases. In a financially constrained system this means funding may need to be found from other areas of the system (e.g. primary and community care), where the system may otherwise wish to invest. Most health systems working toward transformation and increased accountability for patient outcomes have developed their own local payment system to better align incentives.

Examples of systems starting to form accountable care arrangements in UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type (from most to least formal)</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Further details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northumbria ACO: prime provider with full risk share</td>
<td>Health and social care providers (acute, GPs, MH, LAs, ambulances)</td>
<td>320,000 people</td>
<td>Rural population</td>
<td>Full transfer of risk and responsibilities from commissioner to local provider organisation. Function of GPs reduced. Partners co-share both underperformance and overspending according to different proportions. Region has historically strong integrated platform. Model will focus on urgent and emergency care. Result of merger between several health and social care organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torbay and South Devon NHS FT: fully merged with some risk share</td>
<td>Acute, community and social care services</td>
<td>676,000 people</td>
<td>£331 million, 6,000 staff across 2 sites</td>
<td>Regionally integrated health and social care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symphony in South Somerset: corporate JV with some risk share (Outcomes 2.5%)</td>
<td>Secondary, community and primary care</td>
<td>Initially 1,600 people with multiple LTCs</td>
<td>Full population of approx. 540,000</td>
<td>Proposed at least 2.5% (aligned with CQUINs) at risk for delivery outcomes increasing over time. Further risk share plans to be agreed. JV has a single budget for the population and can deliver care across settings. South Somerset is a PAGS vanguard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Nottinghamshire Better Together: memo of understanding without risk share</td>
<td>Services in Primary, secondary, community and social care</td>
<td>318,000 people</td>
<td>Budget of £616 million</td>
<td>Combined CQUIN to incentivise a joint outcomes framework. Signed MOU to work together through a strategic partner board and test a shadow-capped, outcomes-based contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Together in South Yorkshire, Mid Yorkshire and North Derbyshire: loose partnership, no risk share</td>
<td>Acute care only</td>
<td>2.9 million and 7 providers</td>
<td>15 hospital sites, approximately 45,000 staff</td>
<td>Pooled budgets in limited functions such as procurement. Regional trusts in North Yorkshire that pool funds for procurement and is driven through central programme executive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: built on work from McKinsey & Company, October 2016, but updated to reflect ongoing developments. Many of these schemes are currently being developed and we will track their progress, and reflect lessons learned as ELHCP payment development work progresses.
3.14. Within East London, contracts that have developed alternative payment arrangements to support transformation include:

- Tower Hamlets Community Health Services alliance contract, which brings together care across a number of locations, including hospital, community and GP care. Key developments include a new single point of access that is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week; better integration of adult and children services and a single patient record.

- Newham CCG is working closely with the provider based MSK Collaborative to establish a ring fenced contract for MSK activities. The providers will decide how resources are distributed between them. The new contract will provide for incentive payments, risk pools and efficiency savings. Providers have indicated that internal Collaborative transactions will operate on a mixed economy basis - i.e. some components will still comply with National Tariff rules whilst others will be forms that include the potential for block and tolerance type agreement. Providers have the opportunity to minimise risks such as stranded costs via control of a risk pool that will be operated by the Collaborative. There is also an opportunity to link outcomes to this payment arrangement.

3.15. With both NHS and international examples of care transformation, most systems include the following elements as part of their payment systems:

i. Capitated payments\(^{10}\): Most NHS vanguard sites are planning to use capitated contracts with incentives or penalties linked to delivery of outcomes. In addition to the table above, NHS examples include Salford, Dudley, Stockport, Kent and Coastal, Sandwell & West Birmingham CCGs and others. Internationally, systems delivering patient-centred, coordinated care have generally used capitation, whether they be risk adjusted to mirror commissioner allocations or not\(^{11}\).

ii. Outcomes or Incentive based payments:

- Payments linked to patient and population outcomes are a core component of successful systems because they more directly incentivise delivery of desired objectives. This can form a small but important proportion of the overall contract value. Although some areas have developed outcome frameworks, the scope of measures that will be linked to mature contracts has not yet been published by any vanguard area. Some (e.g. Mid-Northernshire Better Together) base contract outcomes on process

\(^9\) The tolerance element relates to elements of growth exceeding expected levels that are driven by higher than expected GP referrals. Further details are TBC as contract negotiations are ongoing.

\(^{10}\) Capitated payment, or capitation, means paying a provider or group of providers to cover the care provided to a specified population across different care settings. The regular payments are calculated as a lump sum per patient.

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/capitation

measures in the short-term, but will move to patient and population outcomes in time.

- Clinical outcomes, for example the Quality and Outcomes Framework are useful to drive an initial change in behaviour, but can be unsustainable as providers rely on payments to continue that behaviour. Depending on outcomes measured, they can be complex to administer for little long-term gain.

iii. Risk-gain share: This can be used as a component of capitated budgets to manage uncertainty in volumes or flows of patients, or to drive specific changes in provider activity.

iv. Pooled budget arrangements between health and social care (e.g. Section 75¹²): These are a useful tool, already in place in most localities. On their own they are not sufficient to align incentives to promote whole population care. However, as part of addressing the wider determinates of health and wellbeing, it is important consider how payment for relevant care can support improved coordination between staff and improve outcomes for people and patients.

3.16. Any development of the payment system that designs incentives needs to take an objective approach to ensure those incentives are placed in the hands of those most capable of making a difference, rather than where it is most expedient. Such work will also need to consider how any payment flows between organisations may be managed appropriately. Alongside payment development evidence shows it is important ensure the relevant governance, reporting and data sharing arrangements are in place.

Considerations for local payment development

3.17. There is no perfect payment system. In practice local systems need to work together to design payment options that work best for their area. Different types of payment are useful to support different system objectives. The table below illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches explored above.

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¹² Section 75 of the NHS Act 2006 gave PCTs and local authorities legal powers to enter into integrated and lead commissioner arrangements. Where lead commissioning arrangements are in place, commissioning duties are delegated between organisations, and one organisation leads on behalf of the other(s) to achieve a jointly agreed set of aims. The lead commissioner is responsible for commissioning the agreed scope of services, within the relevant budget, and for entering into contracts with providers. Governance of integrated or lead commissioning arrangements are typically set out in a section 75 agreement (along with arrangements for pooled budgets).

3.18. Payment for outcomes can apply to any of the above payment types.

3.19. It is possible to meet system objectives using the current payment system through local variations to tariff for given services. Local providers and commissioners have already developed a range of ‘work around’ payment and service solutions for specific types of care. However, without a strategic and coordinated approach to payment across a local health and care system there is a risk that special contract agreements and a proliferation of modifications to service models will lead to increasingly fragmented and incoherent incentives across the system as a whole.

3.20. Any payment development work will need to consider how to support patient choice as part of its objectives. Contract forms for such arrangements can include (i) the commissioner carving out an amount for patient choice from the whole population budget, which is then used to pay out of area providers; or (ii) the identified amount being managed through a prime provider, sub-contractor arrangement – although the latter would require transparent arrangements to address the potential financial conflict of interest. With either arrangement, the amount would be based on an estimated volume of patients. Overspend could be addressed through a risk pool arrangement, however there would be an incentive for providers to maintain and improve quality to encourage patients to choose their service. Analysis based on Service Level Agreement Monitoring (SLAM) data for 2015/16 shows that 87% of total spend on acute tariff-based services within ELHCP is commissioned from providers within the ELHCP footprint.

3.21. Evidence suggests that payment mechanisms that are less complex in structure are easier for all people in the system to understand and react appropriately to. Decisive steps should be taken to minimise complexity, both to enable greater transparency and reduce the bureaucracy associated with a burdensome set of rules and processes.
3.22. Given the challenges the NHS now faces, and the experience of other areas that have implemented reform, there is a strong case to review payment mechanisms to support greater coordination and a patient-centred approach to care.

**Question 3:** What does your organisation want out of the payment system?

**Question 4:** What payment elements do you consider are most important to meet agreed ELHC objectives?

**Question 5:** What payment options do you, as partners in ELHCP, want to explore further?
4. Service model, system organisation and pace of change

Options for organisational form

4.1. This consultation is not about organisational form. However, there is an intrinsic link between organisational form and development of a contract form to support it.

4.2. Successful coordinated systems can operate using a range of contractual forms. An ‘accountable care system’ can operate under one single organisation or, alternatively, governance structures can enable different organisations to operate in a coordinated way. Local partners should consider the local provider landscape and relationships when determining which option is best for their area. Below is a spectrum of options.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountable Care Organisation</td>
<td>Single legal entity</td>
<td>One person (CEO) in charge, with one board, and single accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pooled ‘capitated’ budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Complete risk transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable Care Partnership or System</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Joint accountability via partner board (or lead provider) alongside organisational governance structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some / shadow pooling of budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No risk transfer or shared risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative network</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Boards and CEOs for separate organisations, individual accountability to commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No pooled budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No shared risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3. When considering contract arrangements it will be important to agree the scope and scale of services, as well as what units payment is linked to and what provider(s) payment covers.

4.4. **Scope of payment:** There are two elements to consider

- Setting a ‘whole population’ scope for payment supports a person-centred approach to care, in which no specific condition or disease is singled out. The rationale for this is that it enables a focus on specific segments of the population, not disease pathways, in order to reinforce and encourage integrated working. This offers less complication about when people transition in and out of a pathway and encourages early intervention and management of conditions. Categories could include: Adults with complex needs, children with complex needs, mostly well adults, mostly well children, older adults, under-5 children, etc.

- Setting a condition based approach, for example MSK services or diabetes care can encourage joint working of providers along a limited care pathway. It may not support integrated care for people with multiple conditions.

4.5. **Scale of payment:** A key consideration for payment development is around geographic scale. Scale could be set in a way that is coterminous with local authorities, i.e. at a CCG level, this would support integration with social care. If the focus is to enable better integration between acute and community services, a wider scale footprint may be more appropriate, for example across i) Waltham Forest, Newham and Tower Hamlets; ii) Barking Havering and Redbridge, and iii) City and Hackney. For some care needs it may be appropriate to consider a single payment approach for the whole ELHCP footprint. This can enable discussions about service configurations across geographies to make the most of resources and capabilities across provider organisations.

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**Question 6:** Is it best for payment to cover populations based on a person-centred approach or disease/condition specific approach?

**Question 7:** What geographic footprint is appropriate for payment: CCG level; City and Hackney/Waltham Forest, Newham and Tower Hamlets/Barking and Dagenham, Havering and Redbridge; or across the ELHCP footprint?

**Question 8:** What services would be included in a new payment approach?
Considerations for pace of change

4.6. The move to a new way of paying for care does not need to happen via a ‘big bang’. Most areas that have introduced changes to payment system have done so via an incremental approach, and taken an evidenced based approach to selecting and testing options. A key first stage will be to get data and information in place – outline what type of data is needed (both the minimum needed to support our objectives, and ideally what data we would like to have).

4.7. System partners work together to understand and improve baseline data, and consider evidence about (i) opportunities for service development and/or improve use of resource within existing services; and (ii) implications on the system of different payment methodologies.

4.8. Experience from other areas shows that this initial stage is a vital step toward achieving transformation. This also shows that the relationships and ways of working established when organisations are committed to the process can be as important a lever for change in local systems as the payment, contracting and governance mechanisms that are developed out of that work. However, that development stage requires real commitment and leadership from all partners as well as continual active cooperation in the development process.

Question 9: What steps are needed to secure this type of buy-in and practical engagement among all ELHCP member organisations?
5. What else is needed to support system objectives?

Lessons from other health and care systems

5.1. A number of components are needed to support and enable change within the health and care system. A common vision, good quality data and information (one version of the truth) and structures that allow people in the system to work together to solve collective problems are all essential.

5.2. Experience from other health and care systems show the following elements are needed:

- **An understanding of patient and population needs.** For example, in Somerset the Symphony project Accountable Care Organisation acts as the ‘engine room’, providing data analytics to inform population segmentation, carry out risk stratification (in terms of need and cost), and inform service redesign.

- **Good quality data and information** to inform system-wide decision-making as well as provider actions and the activity of front line staff. Practical examples of where this has worked include Northumberland Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust and Group Health, who operate a closed insurer and provider system in the USA. In both cases, they invested in developing data over time and used this to inform services and care, understand their impact on patients and support continuous improvement using data in an active dialogue led by clinicians.

- **Patient and public feeding into goal-setting and decision-making.** For example, commissioners and providers in Oxfordshire developed an outcomes based commissioning model for adult mental health, which was co-developed with experts-by-experience and third party sector partners. The framework is based on a capitated payment approach linked to outcome measures.
• **Governance assurance tools for cross-boundary working** for safe, high quality care. These give public and providers assurance that safety and quality will not be compromised, and could include:
  - monitoring progress of system goals;
  - monitoring performance of organisations within the accountable care system;
  - infrastructure and planning to raise issues early to deliver services more effectively;
  - aligning assurance across health and social care; and
  - links with others outside the local system (e.g. London Borough Councils, voluntary sector, housing authorities and the education sector if they are not formally part of the accountable care system).

• **Professional working arrangements** across organisational boundaries. This includes setting out routes to develop innovations in care pathways using new technology, skill mix and care delivery.

• **Escalation and dispute resolution routes.** Lessons from Hudson Headwaters Health Network in the US suggest it is important to acknowledge that partnership working is challenging. This includes identifying issues that may arise in a partnership environment, and having mechanisms set up in advance to manage quality issues and disputes.

• **Funding flows that reduce barriers** to front line staff being able to deliver efficient care in a person-centred way. This needs to be supported by complementary organisational structures. It means avoiding overcomplicated management and payment forms. Supporting teams and giving permission to be more innovative and have a greater degree of ownership and using mechanisms that reduce patterns of behaviour that add limited value.

5.3. Based on the evidence above, it is clear that further investment and development is needed to support a system-wide data and analytic function in ELHCP. The aim of this function is to:

a. **Support clinical decision making** - enable continual improvement and best use of resource from front line staff (e.g. adoption of a learning system approach)
b. **Support providers** to manage and monitor performance and resource-use as well as identify (and act on) opportunities to improve care. To do this, providers need to understand outcomes for people in their care, their activity and costs at a granular level and how these relate to resource utilisation.

c. **Enable system management** and improved strategic commissioning to support health and wellbeing across health and care systems - including constructive, evidenced-based discussions on care and quality improvement

5.4. Learning from successful transformation work shows these elements are needed to support analytics and system intelligence:

- **Patient level data** is key to supporting sophisticated system intelligence and clinical decision making. It enables us to track people through care pathways and understand the impact of their interactions with the health and care system.

- **One version of the truth**, where all organisations have access to consistent data and analytic outputs and have the same understanding of where issues and opportunities lie.

- **Use of advanced statistics and analytics** help us understand patterns and correlations. Retail and other sectors have used this for years and it is time for health organisations to make better use of the information we have. NHS England has kicked off a tender process for common specifications and procurement of business intelligence and analytics across London. Data and analytics is a critical part of the work to develop payments and support system development. Therefore, comments on analytic needs are sought as part of this engagement process, which will help inform ELHCP analytic development as well as any London-wide efforts.

- **Patient and population engagement at scale.** As commissioners and providers, we need to complement the data and information within the health and care system with patient and population voices via the appropriate forums and representative groups. This will add depth and understanding to data outputs and offer input to shape analysis undertaken.

- **Patients and carers able to readily access and enter their own details**, to support public engagement and people’s ownership of their care. People are used to this with other services and will increasingly demand this from health and care, it also provides valuable information to inform diagnosis and care13.

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**Question 12**: What do ELHCP partners need to do to build data and analytic capacity within the STP?

**Question 13**: What can be done to support provider understanding of their Service Line Reporting?

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Annex: ELHCP Payment Development Consultation - questions

Below are the thirteen questions asked in this consultation document. This list allows easy access to all questions in a single place and can be copied into another document to help frame your organisation’s written response to this consultation. The deadline for written responses is 18:00 Friday 29 September 2017. This has been extended from the original deadline of 4 September.

Consultation questions

1. What are your top five priority areas relating to the payment system to support better outcomes for patients across the system?

2. In your organisation’s view, how does the current payment system support and inhibit attainment of system objectives?

3. What does your organisation want out of the payment system?

4. What payment elements do you consider are most important to meet agreed ELHCP objectives?

5. What payment options do you, as partners in ELHCP, want to explore further?

6. Is it best for payment to cover populations based on a person-centred approach or disease/condition specific approach?

7. What geographic footprint is appropriate for payment: CCG level; City and Hackney/Waltham Forest, Newham and Tower Hamlets/Barking and Dagenham, Havering and Redbridge; or across the ELHCP footprint?

8. What services would be included in a new payment approach?

9. What steps are needed to secure this type of buy-in and practical engagement among all ELHCP member organisations?

10. What elements are needed to ensure current provider relationships and partnership arrangements support transformation?

11. What skills, capacity and resources would need to be transferred between acute and primary care to support better collaborative working?

12. What do ELHCP partners need to do to build data and analytic capacity within the STP?

13. What can be done to support provider understanding of their Service Line Reporting?